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兰德评论:拜登的南海政策与美越关系的未来

2021-3-25 16:23| 发布者: Damein| 查看: 4551| 评论: 3|原作者: Damein

摘要: https://wemp.app/posts/2e8acc0d-e098-4100-90c6-96501600ca0c 作者: 德里克·格罗斯曼(Derek Grossman),美国兰德公司(Rand Corporation)资深研究员,研究方向为美国国家安全政策与印太安全问题。 译者按 ...
https://wemp.app/posts/2e8acc0d-e098-4100-90c6-96501600ca0c

作者:
德里克·格罗斯曼(Derek Grossman),美国兰德公司(Rand Corporation)资深研究员,研究方向为美国国家安全政策与印太安全问题。

译者按
在特朗普的任期内,越南和美国的关系突飞猛进:两国的贸易总额迅速增加,比十年前翻了74倍;特朗普对越南进行了国事访问;美国两次派遣航母访问越南,并向越南出售军舰,开启了越美军事合作的新篇章。越美之间频繁的经贸和军事交往表明,两国关系进入了一个蜜月期,似乎越南在一夜之间成了美国的准盟友。

然而,美国领导层的更迭给越美关系带来了一定程度的不确定性。总体而言,美国对越南的态度是积极的。为了促进印太地区的自由和开放,拜登政府基本上延续了特朗普政府的印太战略,但在措辞上有所缓和,主要体现在“加强与盟友和合作伙伴的关系”。

越南所处的地理位置及拜登对印太战略的重视,预示着越美关系仍有极大的发展空间。




对拜登南海政策的预测


越南一向采取谨慎、保守的外交政策,避免极端化手段,尤其注意不与中国产生过多摩擦,但却是印太战略的狂热支持者,种种举措均表明其利用外交手段打压中国的意图。越南胡志明市国家大学国际研究所研究员谭桑亨(Tam Sang Huynh)称:“由于中国的南海主张与越南存在较大争议,越南的外交重心正在向美国倾斜。”

此外,越南还表示支持“航行自由”行动。拜登就任美国总统才两个多月,美国军舰就已在南沙群岛和西沙群岛周边开展了三次“航行自由”行动。美国国务卿布林肯(Antony Blinken)重申了特朗普政府对南海争议领土的立场。

拜登政府的对华战略,对越南显然是有利的。2020年5月白宫发布《对华战略方针》,声称要采取对中国采取全面施压。拜登在美国国务院发表的外交政策讲话中指出,“中国为最严峻的竞争者”。他在哥伦比亚广播公司播出的专访中表示,中美正处于一种“极端竞争”状态。拜登政府内部在对华政策上已经形成共识,例如,美国国防部部长奥斯汀(Lloyd Austin)在接受采访时称中国是美国的“主要威胁”,美国国家安全委员会各部门负责人也已经开始关注中国崛起对美国国家安全的影响。

有分析认为,中美日益加剧的竞争提升了越南的战略地位,意味着越南和美国有望加强合作,成为美国在印太地区的重要合作伙伴。早期迹象显示,拜登将延续特朗普政府时期越南和美国之间的战略接触,例如,白宫于今年3月3日发布的《临时国家安全战略方针》(Interim National Security Strategic Guidance)中明确指出,“我们(美国)将深化与印度的伙伴关系,并愿同新西兰、新加坡、越南以及其他东盟成员国一道,推动实现共同目标”。

越南与美国合作的障碍



但越南和美国在进一步推进伙伴关系的过程中仍然需要克服一系列障碍。拜登曾多次表示,促进人权和民主将成为其外交政策的主要关注点之一。越南担心在加强与美国合作对抗中国的同时,会因其人权问题受到美国的批评。

拜登政府是否会以特朗普政府对越南“汇率操纵”的指控及越南购买俄罗斯军事装备的行为为由制裁越南,也是越南不得不考虑的因素。越南在2019年发布的《国防白皮书》中阐明了“四不原则”,即“不参加军事联盟,不仰仗任何一个国家对抗第三国,不在本土建立外国军事基地,不使用武力或以武力相威胁”。

再者,越南军队主要使用的是俄制武器,越美两国在军事技术上的差距可能会成为双方开展联防行动的阻碍。上述因素皆可能导致双边合作受挫。

据一位越南官员透露,越南高层一直在与白宫商议越南国家主席阮富仲访问美国的事宜,但由于种种原因,至今尚未谈妥。越南国家领导人最近一次访问美国距今已超过五年,此次访问未能成行深深地打击了越南对美国的信任。其次,今年2月美方发布的四方部长级会议声明没有明确提及南海问题,这让越南颇为不安。

结语



白宫于今年3月12日发布的四国峰会联合声明可能有利于缓解越南的担忧。该声明写道,美国将继续重视国际法在海洋领域的作用,全面遵守和执行《联合国海洋法公约》的所有规则和程序,并促进世界在海洋安全方面的合作,以应对以规则为基础的海洋秩序面临的挑战。即便如此,仍有一些越南官员认为,最近在美国阿拉斯加州安克雷奇举行的中美“2+2”高层战略对话或多或少对越美关系产生了负面影响。

鉴于越美关系的积极发展态势,故上述风险和挑战均是可控的。拜登政府今后可能会在缓解越南的担忧上做工作,以进一步巩固越南对印太战略的支持。本文认为,邀请阮富仲访问美国是当务之急。谭桑亨称:“尽管意识形态和经济取向等分歧远未消除,但越美两国仍存在利益共同点。”

如果拜登政府能够平衡好越美之间的利益关系,越南可能会对美国保持开放的态度,即便与美国发生战略性矛盾或冲突,两国关系也不会轻易动摇。



★ 本文系IPP独家译著。本文英文版首发于美国兰德公司网站,阅读原文请点击下方“阅读原文”。

译:曾辉,华南理工大学公共政策研究院研究助理。
编辑:IPP传播



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引用 Damein 2021-3-25 15:12
原文

https://www.rand.org/blog/2021/0 ... administration.html

by Derek Grossman

March 16, 2021

After four years of steadily strengthening U.S.-Vietnam security relations under the Trump administration, the presidential transition to Joe Biden naturally carries some measure of uncertainty for Hanoi. Early signs from the Biden administration, however, are extremely positive for Vietnam. It appears that the Biden team essentially plans to retain the Trump administration's Indo-Pacific strategy, aimed at keeping the region “free and open” from Chinese coercion, but with toned down rhetoric and additional emphasis on shoring up ties with allies and partners.

As I have argued previously, Vietnam, though it would not state so publicly to avoid unnecessarily antagonizing China, was an avid supporter of the Trump administration's Indo-Pacific strategy. Hanoi appreciated Washington's focus on the region, particularly on sovereignty disputes that pit it against Beijing in the South China Sea. Vietnam welcomed American support in the form of freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) and official statements. During its short time in office, the Biden administration has already conducted three publicly disclosed FONOPs in the South China Sea in the vicinity of the Spratly Islands (twice) and the Paracel Islands. Moreover, Secretary of State Antony Blinken reaffirmed his predecessor Mike Pompeo's July 2020 shift in South China Sea policy to recognize the existence and legality of maritime counterclaimants' exclusive economic zones (EEZs) over China's “Nine-Dashed Line” claim, which is based on historical territorial rights in contravention of international law and norms of behavior.

It is clear that the Biden administration plans to continue the Trump administration's great power competition with China.

Furthermore, it is clear that the Biden administration plans to continue the Trump administration's great power competition with China. This is a good thing for Hanoi because Washington is demonstrating a long-term resolve to push back against Chinese ambitions. In his major foreign policy speech delivered at the State Department on February 4, President Biden argued that China was a “serious competitor.” A few days later, he gave an interview to CBS' “Face the Nation” in which he described a state of “extreme competition” with China. And his entire administration has been in lockstep on China policy. For example, China has become the “pacing threat” for the Pentagon, and every office within Biden's National Security Council—whether technology, health, climate, etc.—is paying close attention to the national security implications of China's rise.

Finally, Hanoi can hang its hat on the Biden administration's recent decision to specifically name Vietnam as a key partner in the Indo-Pacific. In its “Interim National Security Strategic Guidance” released (PDF) on March 3, the Biden team noted that “We will…work alongside New Zealand, as well as Singapore, Vietnam, and other Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states, to advance shared objectives.” It should be no surprise that Vietnam received a distinct and positive mention. At a recent event hosted by the University of Virginia, U.S. Ambassador Daniel Kritenbrink said, “I think our interests and our vision of the kind of region and world in which we want to live is almost completely aligned.”

But inevitably, there are numerous Vietnamese concerns that have attended the transition to Biden. First, as I have discussed elsewhere, the Biden administration appears to emphasize not only shared national interests, but values as well, such as democracy, freedom, and human rights. For Hanoi, there is likely a certain amount of trepidation regarding the potential consequences of engaging with a more vocal Washington on these issues, which are extremely sensitive for Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) leaders. Additionally, Hanoi likely has concerns about whether the Biden administration will take action against Vietnam for Trump-era allegations that it is a currency-manipulator as well as potential U.S. sanctions against Vietnam for purchasing Russian military equipment under the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act.
Also, in my recent discussions with a Vietnamese interlocutor, there are other brewing concerns. One is that Hanoi has been trying to secure a time for the VCP General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong to visit the White House and meet with President Biden. The last and only time this happened was in July 2015, and so a summit is well overdue, and an inability for Hanoi to get one this year would be considered a setback. Second, following the Quad ministerial meeting in February, Washington's readout noticeably did not include a mention of the South China Sea issue—a worrying sign for Hanoi.

This, however, may have been ameliorated by the Biden administration's statement after the first-ever Quad summit on March 12. The statement read, “We will continue to prioritize the role of international law in the maritime domain, particularly as reflected in UNCLOS [United Nations Law on the Convention of the Law of the Sea], and facilitate collaboration, including in maritime security, to meet challenges to the rules-based maritime order in the East and South China Seas.” Finally, the Vietnamese interlocutor raised concerns that American and Chinese officials meeting in Anchorage, Alaska on March 18 might signal a “reset” in U.S.-China relations that could, in some way, negatively impact U.S.-Vietnam relations.

All of these challenges, however, are manageable given the significant and positive momentum of bilateral ties. Going forward, the Biden administration may seek to alleviate Vietnamese concerns raised here to further solidify Hanoi's support of the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy. The Biden administration is already off to a strong start, but more can certainly be done, such as inviting General Secretary Trong for a visit to the White House. For its part, Vietnam might keep an open mind about the new administration and be willing to accept potential changes to Washington's approach over the next four years.

Derek Grossman is a senior defense analyst at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation, regular contributor to The Diplomat, and adjunct professor at the University of Southern California.

This commentary originally appeared on The Diplomat on March 16, 2021. Commentary gives RAND researchers a platform to convey insights based on their professional expertise and often on their peer-reviewed research and analysis.
引用 黑石头小子 2021-4-2 07:03
当年中国利用美国围堵苏联,也在上世纪八十年代获得了不少投资等好处,越南现在不过是比照中国当年趁机发展——不过越南还是太小了,
引用 盗火者探花 2021-4-18 11:37
美国支持越南,就是为了越南在南沙闹事,搅局南海。

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