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[USA] Course Correction How to Stop China's Maritime Advance

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发表于 2017-6-21 13:04 | 显示全部楼层 |阅读模式
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/a ... 3/course-correction
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9 Z. F) S$ h9 W$ y& H6 f. W2 T5 s1 WBy Ely Ratner
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% I4 B' y" L* H" J% V4 |The South China Sea is fast becoming the world’s most important waterway. As the main corridor between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, the sea carries one-third of global maritime trade, worth over $5 trillion, each year, $1.2 trillion of it going to or from the United States. The sea’s large oil and gas reserves and its vast fishing grounds, which produce 12 percent of the world’s annual catch, provide energy and food for Southeast Asia’s 620 million people.' q5 ^8 ]* M# @. @- G5 V
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But all is not well in the area. Six governments—in Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam—have overlapping claims to hundreds of rocks and reefs that scatter the sea. Sovereignty over these territories not only serves as a source of national pride; it also confers hugely valuable rights to drill for oil, catch fish, and sail warships in the surrounding waters. For decades, therefore, these countries have contested one another’s claims, occasionally even resorting to violence. No single government has managed to dominate the area, and the United States has opted to remain neutral on the sovereignty disputes. In recent years, however, China has begun to assert its claims more vigorously and is now poised to seize control of the sea. Should it succeed, it would deal a devastating blow to the United States’ influence in the region, tilting the balance of power across Asia in China’s favor.
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In early 2014, China’s efforts to assert authority over the South China Sea went from a trot to a gallop." M: D4 ^/ y9 d9 h
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Time is running out to stop China’s advance. With current U.S. policy faltering, the Trump administration needs to take a firmer line. It should supplement diplomacy with deterrence by warning China that if the aggression continues, the United States will abandon its neutrality and help countries in the region defend their claims. Washington should make clear that it can live with an uneasy stalemate in Asia—but not with Chinese hegemony. ' r6 w  {9 {& ^. b( ]" n
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ON THE MARCH# f: L, J2 V8 B( L: b
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China has asserted “indisputable sovereignty” over all the land features in the South China Sea and claimed maritime rights over the waters within its “nine-dash line,” which snakes along the shores of the other claimants and engulfs almost the entire sea. Although China has long lacked the military power to enforce these claims, that is rapidly changing. After the 2008 financial crisis, moreover, the West’s economic woes convinced Beijing that the time was ripe for China to flex its muscles.  m* T; B7 c) K4 l& E
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Since then, China has taken a series of actions to exert control over the South China Sea. In 2009, Chinese ships harassed the U.S. ocean surveillance ship Impeccable while it was conducting routine operations in the area. In 2011, Chinese patrol vessels cut the cables of a Vietnamese ship exploring for oil and gas. In 2012, the Chinese navy and coast guard seized and blockaded Scarborough Shoal, a contested reef in the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone. In 2013, China sent an armed coast guard ship into Indonesian waters to demand the return of a Chinese crew detained by the Indonesian authorities for illegally fishing around Indonesia’s Natuna Islands.
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Then, in early 2014, China’s efforts to assert authority over the South China Sea went from a trot to a gallop. Chinese ships began massive dredging projects to reclaim land around seven reefs that China already controlled in the Spratly Islands, an archipelago in the sea’s southern half. In an 18-month period, China reclaimed nearly 3,000 acres of land. (By contrast, over the preceding several decades, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam had reclaimed a combined total of less than 150 acres.) Despite assurances by Chinese President Xi Jinping in September 2015 that China had “no intention to militarize” the South China Sea, it has been rapidly transforming its artificial islands into advanced military bases, replete with airfields, runways, ports, and antiaircraft and antimissile systems. In short order, China has laid the foundation for control of the South China Sea. 3 n+ H# f. Q1 P. [
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Should China succeed in this endeavor, it will be poised to establish a vast zone of influence off its southern coast, leaving other countries in the region with little choice but to bend to its will. This would hobble U.S. alliances and partnerships, threaten U.S. access to the region’s markets and resources, and limit the United States’ ability to project military power and political influence in Asia.
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) l9 j" d3 Q5 ?1 IChinese soldiers on Woody Island in the Paracel Archipelago, January 2016.) I" {9 P5 Y6 [& k& I
CHINA STRINGER NETWORK / REUTERS
# B, ~! @; |( PChinese soldiers on Woody Island in the Paracel Archipelago, January 2016." }* N: h4 Y/ C4 |( I

; q7 Z6 G+ Q0 Z. I3 I% FMISSING: AMERICA
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Despite the enormous stakes, the United States has failed to stop China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea. For the most part, Washington has believed that as China grew more powerful and engaged more with the world, it would naturally come to accept international rules and norms. For over a decade, the lodestar of U.S. policy has been to mold China into what U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick described in 2005 as “a responsible stakeholder”—which would uphold the international system or, at the least, cooperate with established powers to revise the global order. U.S. policymakers argued that they could better address most global challenges with Beijing on board. 7 f( R  {% b, j0 `6 z8 Z

. j' @" ~0 b( m6 LThe United States complemented its plan to integrate China into the prevailing system with efforts to reduce the odds of confrontation. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton spoke of the need to “write a new answer to the question of what happens when an established power and a rising power meet.” She was referring to the danger of falling into “the Thucydides trap,” conflict between an existing power and an emerging one. As the Athenian historian wrote, “It was the rise of Athens, and the fear that this inspired in Sparta, that made war inevitable.” Wary of a similar outcome, U.S. policymakers looked for ways to reduce tensions and avoid conflict whenever possible. & I# d2 m; O: w

' G2 g) m# ^8 |/ VThis approach has had its successes. The Paris climate accord and the Iran nuclear deal were both the direct result of bilateral efforts to solve global problems together. Meanwhile, U.S. and Chinese officials interacted frequently, reducing misperceptions and perhaps even warding off major crises that could have led to outright conflict.
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Applying this playbook to the South China Sea, the Obama administration put diplomatic pressure on all the claimants to resolve their disputes peacefully in accordance with international law. To deter China from using force, the United States augmented its military presence in the region while deepening its alliances and partnerships as part of a larger “rebalance” to Asia. And although Beijing rarely saw it this way, the United States took care not to pick sides in the sovereignty disputes, for example, sending its ships to conduct freedom-of-navigation operations in waters claimed by multiple countries, not just by China.
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0 u) U# g( u, U' \- iU.S. risk aversion has allowed China to reach the brink of total control over the South China Sea.
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1 m6 d  W# J( A  w5 x+ `Although this strategy helped the United States avoid major crises, it did not arrest China’s march in the South China Sea. In 2015, repeating a view that U.S. officials have conveyed for well over a decade, U.S. President Barack Obama said in a joint press conference with Xi, “The United States welcomes the rise of a China that is peaceful, stable, prosperous, and a responsible player in global affairs.” Yet Washington never made clear what it would do if Beijing failed to live up to that standard—as it often has in recent years. The United States’ desire to avoid conflict meant that nearly every time China acted assertively or defied international law in the South China Sea, Washington instinctively took steps to reduce tensions, thereby allowing China to make incremental gains.
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This would be a sound strategy if avoiding war were the only challenge posed by China’s rise. But it is not. U.S. military power and alliances continue to deter China from initiating a major military confrontation with the United States, but they have not constrained China’s creeping sphere of influence. Instead, U.S. risk aversion has allowed China to reach the brink of total control over the South China Sea.
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U.S. policymakers should recognize that China’s behavior in the sea is based on its perception of how the United States will respond. The lack of U.S. resistance has led Beijing to conclude that the United States will not compromise its relationship with China over the South China Sea. As a result, the biggest threat to the United States today in Asia is Chinese hegemony, not great-power war. U.S. regional leadership is much more likely to go out with a whimper than with a bang.- r1 L2 S% x! S; \

. U! g4 l+ o+ k# M1 O4 R% vTHE FINAL SPRINT! B3 _, ^* H  [0 V. C* T4 L# v
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The good news is that although China has made huge strides toward full control of the South China Sea, it is not there yet. To complete its takeover, it will need to reclaim more land, particularly at Scarborough Shoal, in the eastern part of the sea, where it currently lacks a base of operations. Then, it will need to develop the ability to deny foreign militaries access to the sea and the airspace above it, by deploying a range of advanced military equipment to its bases—fighter aircraft, antiship cruise missiles, long-range air defenses, and more. ) I* t7 y% S, n+ A" _
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The United States has previously sought to prevent China from taking such steps. In recent years, Washington has encouraged Beijing and the other claimants to adopt a policy of “three halts”: no further land reclamation, no new infrastructure, and no militarization of existing facilities. But it never explained the consequences of defying these requests. On several occasions, the United States, along with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the G-7, and the EU, criticized China’s moves. But each time, Beijing largely ignored the condemnation, and other countries did not press the issue for long.
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8 c" {0 F% e) Q% s5 t6 cConsider Beijing’s reaction to the landmark decision handed down in July 2016 by an international tribunal constituted under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which ruled that most of China’s claims in the South China Sea were illegal under international law. The United States and other countries called on China to abide by the decision but took no steps to enforce it. So China simply shrugged it off and continued to militarize the islands and police the waters around them. Although the United States has continued to make significant shows of force in the region through military exercises and patrols, it has never made clear to China what these are meant to signal. U.S. officials have often considered them “demonstrations of resolve.” But they never explained what, exactly, the United States was resolved to do. With that question unanswered, the Chinese leadership has had little reason to reverse course. ! p3 \' K- B3 r1 h1 W

" C/ h' |* Q5 \' J) H9 NFor the same reason, U.S. President Donald Trump’s idea of reviving President Ronald Reagan’s strategy of “peace through strength” by beefing up the U.S. military will not hold China back on its own. The problem has never been that China does not respect U.S. military might. On the contrary, it fears that it would suffer badly in a war with the United States. But China also believes that the United States will impose only small costs for misdeeds that stop short of outright aggression. No matter how many more warships, fighter jets, and nuclear weapons the United States builds, that calculus will not change.
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Chinese structures in the Spratly Islands, April 2017.+ m( H! z. \9 M. q7 v3 d+ J
ERIK DE CASTRO / REUTERS
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DARE TO ACT0 X. b  N8 c' o4 O8 w' Z) ^3 e) ^
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In order to alter China’s incentives, the United States should issue a clear warning: that if China continues to construct artificial islands or stations powerful military assets, such as long-range missiles or combat aircraft, on those it has already built, the United States will fundamentally change its policy toward the South China Sea. Shedding its position of neutrality, Washington would stop calling for restraint and instead increase its efforts to help the region’s countries defend themselves against Chinese coercion. ; J. Z6 I* M  T  p; j2 H/ H* W
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In this scenario, the United States would work with the other countries with claims in the sea to reclaim land around their occupied territories and to fortify their bases. It would also conduct joint exercises with their militaries and sell them the type of weapons that are known to military specialists as “counterintervention” capabilities, to give them affordable tools to deter Chinese military coercion in and around the area. These weapons should include surveillance drones, sea mines, land-based antiship missiles, fast-attack missile boats, and mobile air defenses.: D+ ]7 N) l+ _" v' g) N4 y

% c9 |+ T( I- J/ ?" w5 o7 ?+ c; tA program like this would make China’s efforts to dominate the sea and the airspace above it considerably riskier for Beijing. The United States would not aim to amass enough collective firepower to defeat the People’s Liberation Army, or even to control large swaths of the sea; instead, the goal would be for partners in the region to have the ability to deny China access to important waterways, nearby coastlines, and maritime chokepoints. ) c4 b7 u+ r/ q$ Q8 L

1 [+ ]. G. W& v1 V1 oBeijing will not compromise as long as it finds itself pushing on an open door.8 V; R: X& w! l' g3 x1 _( ?
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The United States should turn to allies and partners that already have close security ties in Southeast Asia for help. Japan could prove especially valuable, since it already sees China as a threat, works closely with several countries around the South China Sea, and is currently developing its own defenses against Chinese encroachment on its outer islands in the East China Sea. Australia, meanwhile, enjoys closer relations with Indonesia and Malaysia than does the United States, as does India with Vietnam—ties that would allow Australia and India to give these countries significantly more military heft than Washington could provide on its own.
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Should Beijing refuse to change course, Washington should also negotiate new agreements with countries in the region to allow U.S. and other friendly forces to visit or, in some cases, be permanently stationed on their bases in the South China Sea. It should consider seeking access to Itu Aba Island (occupied by Taiwan), Thitu Island (occupied by the Philippines), and Spratly Island (occupied by Vietnam)—members of the Spratly Islands archipelago and the first-, second-, and fourth-largest naturally occurring islands in the sea, respectively. In addition to making it easier for the United States and its partners to train together, having forces on these islands would create new tripwires for China, increasing the risks associated with military coercion.% f. E* Q. ~9 y9 i4 Z

" A- l( L% ]- N9 Y# E: PThis new deterrent would present Beijing with a stark choice: on the one hand, it can further militarize the South China Sea and face off against countries with increasingly advanced bases and militaries, backed by U.S. power, or, on the other hand, it can stop militarizing the islands, abandon plans for further land reclamation, and start working seriously to find a diplomatic solution.
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RITCHIE B. TONGO / REUTERS Chinese land reclamation activity on Subi reef in the Spratly Islands, May 2015.' e9 R' }. T+ z7 W8 {
KEEPING THE PEACE
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For this strategy to succeed, countries in the region will need to invest in stronger militaries and work more closely with the United States. Fortunately, this is already happening. Vietnam has purchased an expensive submarine fleet from Russia to deter China; Taiwan recently announced plans to build its own. Indonesia has stepped up military exercises near its resource-rich Natuna Islands. And despite President Rodrigo Duterte’s hostile rhetoric, the Philippines has not canceled plans to eventually allow the United States to station more warships and planes at Philippine ports and airfields along the eastern edge of the South China Sea.$ ]+ t/ n& r: L- x0 s* X  P

0 E7 {) ^# b7 j& O- P) l! yBut significant barriers remain. Many countries in the region fear that China will retaliate with economic penalties if they partner with the United States. In the wake of Trump’s withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement, Southeast Asian countries are increasingly convinced that it is inevitable that China will dominate the economic order in the region, even as many are concerned by that prospect. This growing perception will make countries in the region reluctant to enter into new military activities with the United States for fear of Chinese retribution. The only way for Washington to prevent this dangerous trend is to offer a viable alternative to economic dependence on China. That could mean reviving a version of the TPP or proposing a new and equally ambitious initiative on regional trade and investment. The United States cannot beat something with nothing.
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( @7 J3 U! p  p9 N& n( dWashington should also do more to shape the domestic politics of countries with claims in the South China Sea by publicly disseminating more information about China’s activities in the sea. Journalists and defense specialists currently have to rely on sporadic and incomplete commercial satellite images to understand China’s actions. The U.S. government should supplement these with regular reports and images of China’s weapons deployments, as well as of Chinese navy and coast guard ships and Chinese state-backed fishing vessels illegally operating in other countries’ exclusive economic zones and territorial waters.
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& o' n& {6 v/ A9 Z8 @* JCountries in the region will also be more likely to cooperate with Washington if they can count on the United States to uphold international law. To that end, the U.S. Navy should conduct freedom-of-navigation patrols in the South China Sea regularly, not just when Washington wants to make a diplomatic point.
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1 L/ C9 X) s$ f7 TCritics of a more muscular deterrent argue that it would only encourage China to double down on militarization. But over the last few years, the United States has proved that by communicating credible consequences, it can change China’s behavior. In 2015, when the Obama administration threatened to impose sanctions in response to Chinese state-sponsored theft of U.S. commercial secrets, the Chinese government quickly curbed its illicit cyber-activities. And in the waning months of the Obama administration, Beijing finally began to crack down on Chinese firms illegally doing business with North Korea after Washington said that it would otherwise impose financial penalties on Chinese companies that were evading the sanctions against North Korea. 4 d3 Q/ R$ Y( {4 L$ {( C5 J

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+ [, e5 ^; A+ m/ aMoreover, greater pushback by the United States will not, as some have asserted, embolden the hawks in the Chinese leadership. In fact, those in Beijing advocating more militarization of the South China Sea have done so on the grounds that the United States is irresolute, not that it is belligerent. The only real chance for a peaceful solution to the disputes lies in stopping China’s momentum. Beijing will not compromise as long as it finds itself pushing on an open door. 4 b  o% }& H# z" A8 W

, `9 ?6 H% T5 jAnd in the event that China failed to back down from its revisionist path, the United States could live with a more militarized South China Sea, as long as the balance of power did not tilt excessively in China’s favor. This is why China would find a U.S. threat to ratchet up military support for other countries with claims in the sea credible. Ensuring that countries in the region can contribute to deterring Chinese aggression would provide more stability than relying solely on Chinese goodwill or the U.S. military to keep the peace. Admittedly, with so many armed forces operating in such a tense environment, the countries would need to develop new mechanisms to manage crises and avoid unintended escalation. But in recent years, ASEAN has made significant progress on this front by devising new measures to build confidence among the region’s militaries, efforts that the United States should support.8 {' d% f0 |  D/ b5 \

& Z! n* x7 I/ m$ b6 o$ t- x/ F. VFinally, some critics of a more robust U.S. strategy claim that the South China Sea simply isn’t worth the trouble, since a Chinese sphere of influence would likely prove benign. But given Beijing’s increasing willingness to use economic and military pressure for political ends, this bet is growing riskier by the day. And even if Chinese control began peacefully, there would be no guarantee that it would stay peaceful. The best way to keep the sea conflict free is for the United States to do what has served it so well for over a century: prevent any other power from commanding it.
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 楼主| 发表于 2017-6-21 13:16 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 che 于 2017-6-21 13:41 编辑 1 `' @" E, s# W( ?# C3 m% u
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Ely Ratner 新美国安全中心高级研究员、亚太安全项目副主任  曾担任美国国务院中国事务部主要政治官员,和美国参议院外交关系委员会专家;曾在兰德公司担任助理政治学家;其评论和研究成果发表在《华尔街日报》、《纽约时报》、《华盛顿邮报》和《国家利益》等期刊媒体上。, y3 w' R; g& ~& ~
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改正的过程
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2 \1 d/ E" g0 P( [: D6 h( u# T如何阻止中国的海上前进
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& C4 a& J* K% `https://www.foreignaffairs.com/a ... 3/course-correction
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南海正迅速成为世界上最重要的航道。作为印度洋和太平洋之间的主要通道,海洋占全球海运贸易的三分之一,每年价值超过5兆美元,其中有1兆2000亿美元来自美国。海洋巨大的石油和天然气储量及其广阔的渔场,占世界每年渔获量的12%,为南洋6亿2000万人口提供能源和食物。$ h0 U6 e& r) i( ~( L

3 A% D% t% b4 O4 t4 I但是这个地区的一切都不好。六政府在文莱,中国,马来西亚,菲律宾,台湾,和越南有领土争议上的岩石和珊瑚礁,撒海。对这些领土的主权不仅是民族自豪感的来源,而且也为在周围水域钻探石油、捕鱼和驾驶军舰提供了巨大的宝贵权利。因此,几十年来,这些国家相互争夺对方的主张,有时甚至诉诸暴力。没有一个政府能够控制这个地区,美国选择在主权争端上保持中立。然而近年来,中国已经开始宣示更大力,现在准备夺取海上控制。如果成功的话,它将影响美国在该地区的毁灭性打击,倾斜的权力平衡在亚洲中国的青睐。$ q3 G. y/ K. d9 S- I
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2014年初,中国的努力坚持权威在南海从一个快步奔跑。
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时间不停止中国的前进。在当前美国政策步履蹒跚的情况下,特朗普政府需要采取更强硬的路线。应该补充外交与威慑警告中国,如果攻击继续下去,美国将放弃中立,帮助该地区国家捍卫自己的主张。华盛顿应该明确表示,它可以忍受亚洲的不稳定局面,但不能忍受中国的霸权。8 n/ m( ]) @& C
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在征途
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中国宣称“无可争辩的主权”,在南海所有的土地特征和海洋权益在水域内声称其“九段线”,“这蛇沿着其他国家的海岸,席卷几乎整个海。虽然中国长期缺乏执行这些要求的军事力量,这是快速变化的。2008后金融危机,另外,欧美地区的经济危机使北京,时机成熟时中国大展拳脚。2 b: u5 A8 V! w/ `3 x
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自那以来,中国已采取了一系列措施对南海的控制。2009,中国船只在美国进行例行行动时,骚扰了中国海监船“无暇号”。2011,中国巡逻船切断了越南船只勘探石油和天然气的电缆。2012、中国海军和海岸警卫队扣押并封锁斯卡伯勒浅滩,一个有争议的珊瑚礁在菲律宾专属经济区。2013,中国派出武装海警船到印尼水域要求中国船员被印尼当局非法捕鱼在印度尼西亚返回纳土纳群岛。
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5 d( a' t( ?7 k+ k* K然后,在2014年初,中国的努力坚持权威在南海从一个快步奔跑。中国船舶疏浚工程开始大规模开垦土地七礁,中国在南沙群岛已经控制了四周,在海的南部的一个群岛。在18个月内,中国开垦土地近3000亩。(相比之下,在过去的几十年中,马来西亚,菲律宾,台湾,和越南已经回收了不足150亩。总和)尽管中国国家主席习近平在2015年9月,中国已经“无意军事化”南海保证,它已经迅速转化成先进的人工岛军事基地,充满了机场、跑道、港口、防空和反导系统。在短期内,中国为控制南中国海的基础。/ k2 V4 l" S. S' P5 E

0 G/ v5 v$ n; A- M* X, M中国要在这方面取得成功,它将有望建立影响大区南海岸,把其他国家在没有选择的区域,但它会弯曲。这将使美国的联盟和伙伴关系,威胁到美国访问该地区的市场和资源,并限制美国在亚洲的军事力量和政治影响项目的能力。) I3 o0 i; K2 R7 X  y4 B

3 }# ?$ h3 A9 t  o错失:美国9 i$ P1 R3 j* {5 i3 Y9 w) q/ ]: v5 N
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尽管存在着巨大的风险,美国未能阻止中国在南海的自信。对于大多数的一部分,华盛顿认为中国越来越强大,与世界上更多的,它会自然而然地接受国际规则和规范。十多年来,美国政策的目标是塑造中国为美国副国务卿Robert Zoellick称2005为“负责任的利益相关者”将秉承国际体系或,至少,与老牌大国合作修改的全球秩序。美国政策制定者辩称,他们可以更好地解决北京面临的大多数全球性挑战。# z9 Z: W. {9 ~8 G( h6 k

# b* L+ H0 n1 c/ W( A. f) J: |% V& E美国补充其整合中国融入系统,努力减少冲突的可能性的计划。美国国务卿Hillary Clinton表示要“写一个新的答案的问题,当一个守成大国和新兴大国相遇。”她指的是危险陷入“修昔底德陷阱”、“现有大国和新兴之间的冲突。正如雅典历史学家所写的,“这是Athens的崛起,以及这种恐惧在斯巴达引起的恐惧,使战争不可避免。”出于对类似结果的警惕,美国的政策制定者们寻找各种方法来缓和紧张局势,尽可能避免冲突。
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5 J9 c* S  f. V' ?5 p这种方法已经取得了成功。巴黎气候协定和伊朗核协议都是双边努力共同解决全球问题的直接结果。同时,美国和中国官员互动频繁,减少甚至消除误解,可能导致直接冲突的重大危机。  \2 a  m* B; n/ L5 E, ]3 r: D
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应用这个剧本到南海,奥巴马政府对所有的申请人提出的外交压力,和平解决符合国际法的争议。为了阻止中国使用武力,美国增强其在该地区的军事存在而深化的联盟和伙伴关系的一部分,一个更大的“再平衡”到亚洲。虽然北京很少看到这种方式,美国却不在主权争议,挑边例如,派遣船只在水中的多个国家宣称进行导航操作的自由,不只是中国。0 _& Y) r0 ~0 I: ?; ]

5 y/ f, F1 ~$ b: E1 Y% J0 ~8 x$ G美国风险规避已经允许中国在南海达到总量控制的边缘。$ ~4 V2 t2 b+ J3 o* J3 ]

+ W- }  Q- f! q  L8 d8 t虽然这种方法帮助美国避免重大危机,它没有在南海中国3月逮捕。2015、重申,美国官员已经把十多年来,美国总统贝拉克·奥巴马与习近平联合召开的新闻发布会上说,“美国欢迎一个中国是和平的崛起,稳定,繁荣,和在全球事务中负责任的一员”,但华盛顿从来没有明确什么如果北京未能达到这个标准往往已经在最近几年。美国为了避免冲突意味着几乎每一次中国行动果断或无视国际法在南海的愿望,华盛顿本能地采取措施缓解紧张局势,从而使中国使增量收益。
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; X: p5 J2 h% w( T" G这将是一个合理的策略,如果避免战争被中国的崛起所带来的挑战。但事实并非如此。美国的军事力量和同盟关系继续阻止中国发起大规模军事对抗美国,但他们没有约束中国的蠕变的影响范围。相反,美国的风险厌恶使得中国达到在南海总控制的边缘。1 n% m& k9 i  r1 @

( `: v. c$ b/ f9 Y; q- T! t  d美国的决策者应该认识到,中国在海上的行为是基于其对美国将如何回应。美国缺乏抵抗力,导致北京认为美国不会妥协与中国的关系在南海。因此,今天美国在亚洲面临的最大威胁是中国霸权,而不是大国战争。美国地区的领导地位比一声巨响,出门一声更可能。
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最后的冲刺
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好消息是,尽管中国已取得了巨大的进步在南海的完全控制,这是没有。为了完成它的接管,它需要开垦更多的土地,特别是在黄岩岛东部海域,那里目前缺乏行动基地。然后,它将需要发展拒绝外国军队进入大海和上面的空域的能力,通过部署一系列先进的军事设备,其基地的战斗机,反舰巡航导弹、远程防空系统,和更多。5 |% `- m* B, ]5 B
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美国曾试图阻止中国采取这样的步骤。近年来,华盛顿方面鼓励北京和其他国家采取“三停”政策:没有进一步的土地复垦,没有新的基础设施,并没有军事化的现有设施。但它从未解释违抗这些要求的后果。在一些场合,美国与东南亚国家联盟(东盟),七国集团和欧盟的批评,中国的举动。但每次北京都无视这一指责,其他国家也没有把这个问题拖得太久。+ v8 ~$ m5 `8 ^9 r' C# n  ]

" X: o7 a4 s) r考虑北京的反应,这一里程碑式的决定下来在2016年7月由一个国际法庭构成对联合国海洋法公约下,裁定,大多数中国的要求在南海是违反国际法的。美国和其他国家呼吁中国遵守的决定,但是没有采取强制执行措施。所以中国只是耸耸肩继续军事化的岛屿周围的水域和警察。虽然美国继续在该地区的力量明显显示通过军事演习和巡逻,它从来没有明确向中国这些都意味着信号。美国官员经常把他们看作是“决心的展示”,但他们从来没有解释美国到底决心做什么。没有回答这个问题,中国领导层几乎没有理由改弦易辙。4 @& n& o" R6 D

/ j6 e1 f, a/ ~$ u$ S出于同样的原因,美国总统唐纳德·特朗普的想法让罗纳德·里根总统的策略“以实力求和平”通过加强美军不会让中国回到自己的。这个问题绝不是中国不尊重美国的军事力量。相反,它担心它会在与美国的战争中遭受严重的损失。但中国也认为,美国将停止公然的侵略罪行,只要求小成本。不管美国造多少军舰、喷气式战斗机和核武器,微积分都不会改变。  n+ ~$ H: [( q# F' k
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敢做9 a) H% U' F% g8 B1 F2 |4 i. X

- c8 [9 e0 o+ Q为了改变中国的刺激,美国应该发出明确的警告:如果中国继续建造人工岛屿或站强大的军事资产,如远程导弹和作战飞机,对那些已经建成,美国将从根本上改变对南中国海的政策。华盛顿将不再采取中立立场,不再要求克制,而是加大努力,帮助该地区各国抵御中国的胁迫。5 J$ k1 N4 d* w6 T! \
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在这种情况下,美国将与其他有海上主权的国家合作,在被占领土周围填海造地并加强其基地。它还将以他们的军队进行联合演习和出售武器,军事专家称为“反干涉”能力的类型,给他们负担得起的手段来阻止中国的军事胁迫和周围地区。这些武器包括无人侦察机、水雷、陆基反舰导弹,快速攻击导弹艇,和移动防空系统。
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这样的程序会使中国的努力,称霸海洋和它上面的风险大大增加,北京的领空。美国不会为了积累足够的集体火力打败人民解放军,或是可以控制大片的海域;相反,我们的目标是在该地区的合作伙伴有能力阻止中国访问重要的水道和海上咽喉要道附近的海岸线。
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只要北京发现自己在敞开大门,就不会妥协。1 Z( `5 P8 N0 t* ?6 o8 g  M
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美国应该求助于已经在南洋有密切安全关系的盟友和伙伴寻求帮助。日本可能被证明是特别有价值,因为它已经把中国视为威胁,与在南海的几个国家,是目前在东中国海外海岛发展针对中国侵犯自己的防御。与此同时,澳大利亚与印度尼西亚和马来西亚的关系比美国更密切,印度与越南的关系也一样,这将使澳大利亚和印度能够给这些国家提供比华盛顿本身更大的军事分量。
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如果北京拒绝改变路线,华盛顿也应该协商新的协议,与地区国家允许美国和其他友军访问或,在某些情况下,永久驻扎在南海的基地。它应该考虑寻求进入太平岛(被台湾占领)、中业岛(由菲律宾占领),和南威岛(被越南占领)成员的南沙群岛第一、第二、和第四大天然的海岛,分别。此外,这使得美国和它的合作伙伴更容易培养起来的,这些岛屿上有力量将为中国创造新的绊网,增加军事胁迫相关的风险。0 u0 M9 O# x; U& y) R. `1 j

/ d& M9 `1 w5 K; V2 w这个新的威慑就目前北京只有一个选择:一方面,它可以进一步军事化的南海,面对国家日益先进的基地和军队,由美国支持的力量,或者,在另一方面,它可以阻止军事化的岛屿,放弃进一步的土地复垦计划,并开始认真工作找到外交解决方案。; z+ `0 R& o! J/ C% y0 X
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维持和平6 T% `# K; J5 P. Y% k0 e
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要使这一战略取得成功,该地区各国将需要投资更强大的军队,并与美国更密切地合作。幸运的是,这已经发生了。越南已经购买了一个昂贵的潜艇舰队从俄罗斯阻止中国;台湾最近宣布建立自己的。印度尼西亚已经加强了军事演习,在资源丰富的纳土纳群岛。尽管Rodrigo Duterte总统的敌对言论,菲律宾没有取消计划最终让美国站更多的军舰和飞机在菲律宾港口和机场,沿南海东部边缘。
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' r- e' b9 F" m  r9 m" s但仍然存在重大障碍。在该地区担心中国会报复经济处罚,如果他们与美国的合作伙伴,许多国家。在特朗普从跨太平洋伙伴关系贸易协议撤军之后,东南亚国家越来越相信,中国将在该地区占主导地位的经济秩序是必然的,即使有很多的担心。这种日益增长的看法将使该地区的国家不愿与美国进行新的军事活动,以免受到中国人的报复。华盛顿为了防止这种危险的趋势,唯一的办法是提供一个可行的替代方案,对中国经济的依赖。这可能意味着恢复TPP的一个版本,或提出一项关于区域贸易和投资的新的、同样雄心勃勃的倡议。美国什么也不能打败。
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5 H2 ^' _4 k$ H0 ~华盛顿也应该做更多的形状与公开传播关于在中国的海洋活动的更多信息在南海宣称国家的国内政治。记者和国防专家目前不得不依靠零星的和不完整的商业卫星图像来理解中国的行动。美国政府应该补充这些定期报告和中国的武器部署的图像,以及中国海军和海岸的船只和由政府支持的中国渔船在其他国家的专属经济区和领海非法作业防护。
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- o- t( {, I# u" a& R4 H1 B如果能指望美国维护国际法,该地区的国家也将更有可能与华盛顿合作。为此,美国海军应该在南海定期进行导航巡逻的自由,不只是在华盛顿,想要做一个外交上的。: G) C% J3 }+ d5 F+ }0 Q% [
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一个更有力的威慑的批评者认为,它只会鼓励中国在军事化双下降。但在过去的几年中,美国已经证明,通过可信的后果,它可以改变中国的行为。2015,当奥巴马政府威胁要对中国政府资助的美国商业秘密进行制裁时,中国政府迅速制止了其非法网络活动。在奥巴马政府日渐衰弱的几个月里,北京终于开始打击非法与朝鲜合作的中国公司,此前华盛顿表示,否则将对逃避制裁朝鲜的中国公司实施经济处罚。" X0 d$ i2 M/ F( ~( D+ y

5 `1 Z) j# u. j7 x0 T) y. W此外,由美国大反弹不会有断言,让老鹰在中国领导。事实上,北京人更崇尚军事化的南中国海已经这样做了,美国犹豫不决的理由,不是因为它是好战的。为和平解决争端的唯一真正的机会在于阻止中国的发展势头。只要北京发现自己在敞开大门,就不会妥协。  Q/ j$ n* X! c3 p# p( b& T
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在事件,中国没有退缩的修正主义路线,美国可能有更多的军事化的南海生活,只要权力平衡不倾斜过度中国的青睐。这就是为什么中国会威胁美国与其他国家的主张在海上可靠加大军事支持。确保该地区各国能够为遏制中国侵略作出贡献,将比单纯依靠中国善意或美国军队维持和平提供更多的稳定。诚然,由于如此多的武装部队在这样紧张的环境中工作,各国需要开发新的机制来管理危机,避免意外升级。但近年来,东盟在这方面取得了重大进展,制定了新的措施,在地区军队中建立信任,美国应予以支持。( X' z$ b9 T! ~- a- c3 H5 j: w

8 c; G, e) R5 Q/ q6 Q5 ]最后,一个更强大的美国战略声称南海根本是不值得的麻烦,一些批评,因为中国的影响范围可能是良性的。但鉴于北京越来越愿意利用经济和军事压力来实现政治目的,这一赌注在白天越来越危险。即使中国的控制开始和平,也不能保证它会保持和平。保持海洋无冲突的最好办法是让美国在一个多世纪的时间里尽其所能,防止任何其他的力量指挥它。
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发表于 2017-6-21 15:09 | 显示全部楼层
尽管是极个别人,但值得警惕的动向
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