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Australia's 60-Year-Old South China Sea Prophecy Comes True

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发表于 2017-7-3 19:30 | 显示全部楼层 |阅读模式
Archival documents show that Australia’s position on the South China Sea disputes has been consistent since the 1950s.
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& I' e# ~0 S, x0 r* F1 Q' a- l( @http://thediplomat.com/2017/06/a ... rophecy-comes-true/& C) k2 Y2 X6 i$ q: n2 O

: ^/ `( t0 K& F7 \6 q5 MBy Elliot Brennan3 M5 C; l/ a& X8 z& D$ d+ U2 `
June 12, 2017
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: e* D6 G8 C$ M+ G0 o: nCommunity consultations for Australia’s 2016 Defense White Paper hit the nail on the head: Australia has publicly taken a “stand” but not taken a “side” in the territorial disputes in the South China Sea.
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+ S) S5 \" q* wThat’s not to say the issue is not of core national interest. All three of the stated Strategic Defense Interests in the 2016 white paper that “drive Australia’s defense strategy” relate to the South China Sea: a secure, resilient Australia, with secure northern approaches and proximate sea lines of communication; a secure nearer region, encompassing maritime Southeast Asia and the South Pacific; and, a stable Indo-Pacific region and a rules-based global order.. {2 q/ n! {/ z& w4 y* q% ^6 J* U
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These drivers of Australia’s defense strategy haven’t shifted on the South China Sea. Indeed, they have for more than half a century remained incredibly consistent.
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# v6 g& r' C" U* Y8 |; [Handwritten, often illegible, pre-1959 filings from the Department of External Affairs (a forerunner to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade) offer one of the first Australian accounts of concern over territorial disputes in the South China Sea. The declassified memos and documents, many marked Secret, record Australia’s strategic concern over the islands and reveal Canberra’s long-running desire to see a peaceful resolution to the disputes. Among the documents is a briefing on the military significance of the disputed islands from Australia’s Joint Intelligence Committee in 1959. It read:
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On 27th April 1950, in connection with the formation of a draft peace treaty with Japan, the Defense Committee agreed that it was in Australia’s strategic interests to work for U.S. Trusteeship of the Spratly Islands. In fact, the Peace Treaty left the question of sovereignty unsettled.( ^3 `8 h: S0 J; p6 e9 o
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It continued:, E; D* s) Q/ g: j
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In May 1950, Australia was concerned, for strategic reasons, that the Spratly Islands might fall into Chinese Communist hands. In an attempt to forestall this, the United Kingdom was sounded out about accepting trusteeship of the islands. The United Kingdom replied that they would probably be unwilling to do anything which would embarrass them in relations with the Communist Chinese. They foresaw the danger their occupation of the islands might be resisted.$ M0 Q) W- O9 _1 A

3 B6 B. P( M) g2 {& K1 f' HThe briefing demonstrated a clarity on the strategic importance of the islands and potential avenues for resolution. Australia’s eagerness for the U.K., which has a sound basis as a potential claimant of the Spratly Islands (outlined here), to take an active role in trusteeship of the islands fell on deaf ears. Instead the U.K. deflected, suggesting instead that France may be better placed in their claim given they had not yet recognized China.
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Yet more prophetically the briefing noted that:
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If, in the longer term, the Communist Chinese were to develop the islands militarily, they could make a nuisance out of themselves on the international shipping and air routes on the pretext of infringements of territorial waters and air space and might even shoot down an aircraft occasionally. Again, there is little the West is likely to do, except protest.
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The briefing showed a depth of thought on the South China Sea far exceeding the small-Australia views of the day. This “nuisance” factor was explained further, with the briefing suggesting the possible construction of airfields, radar and radio intercept stations, as well as surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles on the islands, but the document questioned the efficacy of such new facilities.
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The 1959 Australian declassified document noted:
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Although it would be possible to build airfields on the larger islands, these would only be of limited value because of restrictions on the length of runways (maximum length would be about 5000’ on Itu Aba) and the direction of the prevailing winds. However, looking further ahead to vertical take-off fighters and surface-to-air and surface-to-surface missiles the islands could become more useful, provided, of course, the occupying power was able to guarantee adequate logistic support.* ?* X. ]0 s+ o
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And continues:  s1 O+ T. }# G' [* F; U& p% _- I  P
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If air warning radars or radio intercept stations were erected in the Paracels it would extend considerably the cover which the Communist Chinese now enjoy from stations on Hainan and in North Vietnam. Bases in those islands would probably also have similar advantage to the West.
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- b$ Z! x4 ]4 ]) {: cIn conclusion, it noted:
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1 ?# q+ }9 c% ^2 _" \# F7 S6 UProvided the United States maintains its present air and sea supremacy in the area, it could, if it wished, quickly neutralize any Communist Chinese Military bases on the islands.$ _) C/ K9 E' i

; f. [" f, O( `After the briefing had been circulated in Australia’s policy community, the briefing was forwarded to the Australian Embassy in Washington for discussion with the U.S. State Department. The response from U.S. officials left a lot to be desired. A cable (SAV.489; Secret; 30th August 1959) from the Australian Embassy quoted the Deputy Director of Chinese Affairs as saying that on the island disputes in the South China Sea, the “United States policy was one of ‘let sleeping dogs lie’.” As a scribbled note from an Australian official on an archived copy of the cable recorded, “Politically, this is not a very satisfactory outcome.”7 k7 J" @0 m! R$ T( W, ?

' T9 `, w' F0 s! gThe National Archives of Australia also catalog intelligence sharing on the disputed islands between Canberra and London from the same period. Australia’s prescient analysis on the disputes fell on deaf ears there, as well as in Washington. Almost 60 years later, and now faced with China-the-superpower instead of China-the-minnow, the document reads as if a blueprint for China’s development of the islands. For Canberra, the briefing demonstrates a long-held concern over the South China Sea.
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Indeed, much of what is documented in the archives is relevant today. In recent years this hesitancy to speak plainly on the disputes has given way to greater confidence and direct statement of Australia’s interests, as seen progressively in Defense White Papers from 1994 until 2016. Even before then, the 1987 Defense White Paper explicitly noted the routine nature of surveillance over the South China Sea by RAAF Orion aircraft. “Australia will also continue to… operate Orion long range maritime patrol aircraft from Butterworth to maintain surveillance over the South China Sea,” it says. Overflights continue today with RAAF AP-3C Orion surveillance aircraft.
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' E; {* P; m" p$ EThis consistent policy position demonstrates the central national interest of the South China Sea for Australian foreign and economic policy. The previous “let sleeping dogs lie” approach should be a prompt for today’s decision makers to engage deeply with all parties on the issue, while continuing to conduct routine operations in and above the South China Sea. If this falters, the outcome will be very unsatisfactory indeed.
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The above is an edited extract from Out of the ‘Slipstream’ of Power?: Australian Grand Strategy and the South China Sea Disputes, published by the Institute for Security and Development Policy (Sweden). The full text can be found here.% m8 @9 J* `5 |

7 i& r. @7 G9 cElliot Brennan is a Non-Resident Research Fellow with the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Sweden.
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 楼主| 发表于 2017-7-3 19:34 | 显示全部楼层
澳大利亚60岁的南中国海的预言成真
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$ J& q! j. E3 l( I档案文件显示,在南海澳大利亚争端的位置已经自上世纪50年代是一致的。

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Elliot Brennan9 ~: e, L- n. j7 O
2017年6月12日' F, ?# R' c( {! ~7 l/ u

: Z2 r& a0 W# J5 x. @# b社区咨询澳大利亚2016国防白皮书一针见血:澳大利亚公开采取“站”而不是采取“面”在南海的领土争端。
' z  Y* ]8 H/ R/ O这并不是说这个问题不是核心的国家利益。所有三的既定战略防御利益在2016白皮书,“推动澳大利亚国防战略”与南海的安全,有弹性的澳大利亚,与北方的方法和通信安全接近海线;安全更近的区域,包括海上南洋和南太平洋地区;和,一个稳定的印度太平洋地区一个基于规则的全球秩序。! D( q3 `/ u  @1 d
这些司机澳大利亚国防战略没有对南海移。事实上,他们在半个多世纪中一直保持着难以置信的一致性。
. }8 \$ a& J4 @6 A手写的,往往难以辨认,1959年前提交的对外事务部(先行者的外交贸易部)提供了一个在南海的领土争端问题的第一个澳大利亚账户。解密的备忘录和文件,许多明显的秘密,记录了澳大利亚对这些岛屿的战略关切,揭示了堪培拉长期以来渴望和平解决争端的愿望。文件中有一份关于1959澳大利亚联合情报委员会有争议岛屿军事意义的简报。它读:
6 B$ n! Y2 ^5 z* D! Z/ A( o1 \0 I1950年4月27日,在与日本起草和平条约的过程中,国防委员会一致认为为美国托管南沙群岛工作符合澳大利亚的战略利益。事实上,和平条约使主权问题悬而未决。. B; e, L) N+ c9 u. k
它继续:7 f- R+ r2 `% |+ H- b
1950年5月,由于战略原因,澳大利亚担心南沙群岛可能落入中国共产党手中。为了避免这一情况,英国被宣布接受托管岛屿。英国答复说,他们可能不愿做任何使中国共产党人感到难堪的事情。他们预见到了对这些岛屿的占领可能遭到抵制的危险。# [1 T4 Z2 C: e
简报显示了群岛的战略重要性和解决问题的可能途径。澳大利亚渴望的英国,有一个良好的基础的南沙群岛潜在申请人(这里),把岛屿托管的积极作用置若罔闻。相反,英国偏转,这表明,法国可能是更好的放在他们的要求给予他们并没有认识到中国。0 l0 o, M) k6 L  C2 x
然而,更多的简报指出,预言:
5 R- o) t. U: m; Z如果从长远来看,中国共产党人是在军事上发展岛屿,他们可能以侵犯领海和领空为由,在国际航运和航空航线上制造麻烦,甚至可能偶尔击落一架飞机。同样,除了抗议之外,西方几乎不可能做什么。
" R  q9 Q! {( O7 z* E# {通报显示,在南中国海远远超过小天的澳大利亚观的思想深度。这个“讨厌”的因素作了进一步的说明,详细介绍说明机场建设可能,雷达和无线电监听站,以及表面和表面对空导弹的岛屿,但文件质疑这样的新设施的效能。. [+ x* y, o' T. i
1959澳大利亚解密文件指出:; D' ^, y4 w# Z: ?$ V
虽然它可能建立机场在较大的岛屿,这些只会是有限的价值,因为在跑道的长度限制(最大长度大约5000的ITU ABA)与盛行风的方向。然而,如果进一步着眼于垂直起飞战斗机和空对地导弹和地对空导弹,这些岛屿将变得更加有用,当然,占领国能够保证提供足够的后勤保障。+ f6 [+ m3 _  _  i& H, Y% R
并继续:
: r3 j5 A/ U9 K0 m* ^6 r如果空中预警雷达或无线电截收站竖立在西沙将大大延长盖中国共产党现在享受站在海南和越南北部。这些岛屿的基地也可能与西方有类似的优势。+ ]1 g4 r  G/ V3 {
最后,它指出:- h) B4 g1 u! C( R8 Y, f' k
如果美国维持该地区目前的空中和海上霸主地位,如果它愿意的话,它可以迅速压制任何在该岛上的中国共产党军事基地。: E" T* `# G+ G2 K; q& g
在澳大利亚政策界散发简报后,向澳大利亚驻华盛顿大使馆通报情况,以便与美国国务院进行讨论。美国官员的反应还有很多有待改进的地方。电缆(sav.489;秘密;1959年8月30日)从澳大利亚大使馆援引中国事务副主任说,在南海岛的争端,“美国的政策是“睡吧”,“作为一个潦草的笔记从澳大利亚官方的存档记录的电缆,“在政治上,这不是一个令人满意的结果。”
3 F$ C5 \' z; ~2 U" ~. d) b' }$ j澳大利亚国家档案馆还对同一时期堪培拉和伦敦之间有争议的岛屿进行情报共享。澳大利亚的纠纷有先见之明的分析置若罔闻,以及在华盛顿。近60年过去了,现在面临着中国而不是中国的鱼的超级大国,文件读取如中国钓鱼岛的发展蓝图。堪培拉,介绍了长期关注南海。! j& r( J# ]1 Y$ i* O9 m* o
事实上,档案中记载的大部分内容与今天有关。近年来这种犹豫不决地说在纠纷已经让位给更大的信心和澳大利亚利益的直接表态,如逐步在国防白皮书从1994到2016。而在此之前,1987的国防白皮书明确指出,在南海的澳大利亚皇家空军猎户座飞机监视的日常性。“澳大利亚也将继续…操作猎户座远程海上巡逻机巴特沃斯维持对南海的监测,”它说。飞越继续今天RAAF AP-3C猎户座侦察机。+ [3 m6 o& V2 l  D9 D$ w
这种一致的政策立场表明澳大利亚外交和经济政策的南海中央国家利益。以前的“睡吧”的方法应该是今天的决策者进行深入与各方对这个问题的提示,同时继续进行日常业务和在南海。如果上不去,结果会很不令人满意的事实上。$ `  X+ ]5 Y- W* R6 ]
以上是编辑提取出权力“滑流”吗?:澳大利亚大战略和南海纠纷,公布的安全和发展政策研究所(瑞典)。全文可以在这里找到。
* y8 V" R2 p1 D! E) ZElliot Brennan是瑞典安全与发展政策研究所的非驻地研究员。
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